Financial Reporting Quality, Executive Stock Options and Business Ethics by Rakoto, Philémon
Financial Reporting Quality, Executive Stock 
Options and Business Ethics 
 
Philémon Rakoto 
 
Abstract— This paper tests the improvement of financial 
reporting quality when firms award stock options to their 
executives. The originality of this study is that we introduce 
the moderating effect of business ethics in the model. The 
sample is made up of 116 Canadian high-technology firms 
with available data for the fiscal year ending in 2012. We 
define the quality of financial reporting as the value 
relevance of accounting information as developed by 
Ohlson. Our results show that executive stock option award 
alone does not improve the quality of financial reporting. 
Rather, the quality improves when a firm awards stock 
options to its executives and investors perceive that the level 
of business ethics in that firm is high. 
Keyword—value relevance; high-tech firms; stock options; 
business ethics. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Executive stock option plans were popularized by 
successful IT firms. Executive stock option award can be 
explained by agency theory. This theory states that the 
interests of executives and shareholders should be 
aligned to reduce conflicts of interest between them. The 
holding of stock options by corporate managers thus 
helps resolve agency conflicts by aligning the firm’s 
managerial decisions with shareholders’ interests. 
However, awarding stock options to executives has 
had perverse effects. The Enron and Nortel scandals in 
the United States and Canada have shown that to 
artificially inflate the share price of their firms and 
therefore exercise their stock options for substantial 
gains, executives are willing to do anything, including 
fraudulently manipulating financial statements. Also, 
back dating scandals received extensive coverage in the 
financial newspapers in the 2000s, especially in the 
United States (see, for example [1] and [2]).The business 
ethics of the executives involved in these scandals have 
been severely questioned. Are these behaviors exceptions 
or are they the reality of most firms? 
The objective of this paper is to examine the effect 
of executive stock option award on the quality of 
financial reporting. We define the quality of financial 
reporting by the value relevance of accounting 
information, following Ohlson’s model [3] in which a 
company’s share value depends on the book value of 
equity and earnings. The original contribution of this 
paper is that we introduce the moderating effect of the 
perceived level of executives’ business ethics in the value 
relevance model. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Value Relevance of Accounting Information 
The model frequently used to test the relevance of 
accounting information is that developed by Ohlson [3 
and 4]. In this model, net accounting earnings and the 
book value of equity explain the company's market value. 
Reference [5] conducted a longitudinal study that covers 
115,154 US observations (company years), and found 
that the value relevance of accounting information has 
evolved over the 1953-1993 period. Whereas at the start 
of the period the net earnings and the book value of 
equity were of equal importance in the relationship 
between market value and accounting information, the 
importance of the book value of equity subsequently 
increased, disproportionately with that of net earnings.  
The current state of knowledge reinforces the 
importance of the book value of equity to the detriment of 
net earnings when one examines the association between 
market value and accounting information reported. To 
improve the observed relevance of accounting 
information, some studies have added other independent 
variables to Ohlson’s original model [3]. 
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B. Financial Reporting Quality and Executive Stock 
Option Award 
To our knowledge, no previous study has examined 
whether investors’ perception of the quality of 
accounting information reported changes when the 
company issues executive stock options. Scandals 
reported in the previous section could have a negative 
effect on the perceptions of readers of financial 
statements. 
Some studies have examined the value relevance of 
the way executive stock options are presented in 
published financial statements [6], [7]. These studies 
compared value relevance when options are measured 
and presented in financial statements as components of 
equity, and when options are presented only in notes to 
financial statements. Most authors have found that 
presentation in equity is perceived more favorably by 
capital markets because it allows a more significant 
association between accounting information and share 
price. 
C. Financial Reporting Quality and 
Executives’Business Ethics 
Executives’ business ethics are difficult to observe. 
The majority of firms have their own code of ethics, 
typically found in the section reserved for investors on 
their website. However, because of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors, publishing a 
code of ethics does not guarantee that every manager of a 
firm abides by this code of ethics. 
Reference [8] examined the association between 
business ethics and financial reporting quality. Business 
ethics was proxied by diversity management in line with 
the ratings of Jantzi Research, a provider of social and 
governance research for institutional investors. A positive 
association between diversity management and financial 
reporting quality was documented. 
In the absence of a direct measure of the level of 
executives’ business ethics, we introduce the level of 
business ethic as perceived by investors. We identify 
from the management proxy circular, which firm has 
taken concrete actions to ensure that its executives 
comply with their code of ethics. These actions range 
from the appointment of a compliance officer that 
ensures compliance with the code of ethics to 
establishment of a whistleblower policy guaranteeing 
anonymity and protection of whistleblowers who report 
executives’ unethical behaviors.  
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. Variable Definitions 
The variables used in the empirical models in the next 
section are defined as follows: 
Pricei: the market value per share, or price per share 
of firm i’s equity three months after the end 
of the fiscal year 2012. This grace period 
after the end of the fiscal year is considered 
as the period in which the capital market 
finishes integrating all of the accounting 
information from the fiscal year 
(announcement of earnings in newspapers 
and publication of audited financial 
statements). This period should be as short as 
possible to avoid the integration of 
subsequent information. 
EPSi: earnings per share for firm i at the end of the 
fiscal year 2012. 
BVSi: book value of equity per share for firm i at 
the end of the fiscal year 2012. 
OPTi: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if firm i 
awards executives stock options in fiscal year 
2012, and 0 otherwise. 
ETHi: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if firm i 
has taken concrete actions to ensure that its 
executives comply with their code of ethics 
during fiscal year 2012, and 0 otherwise. 
Sizei: firm i size calculated as the natural logarithm 
of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2012. 
Levi: firm i leverage calculated as the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets at the end of fiscal 
year 2012. 
Growthi: the ratio of the market value to the book 
value of equity of firm i at the end of fiscal 
year 2012. 
Lossi: dummy variable included in the regression 
models to account for negative net earnings 
for the fiscal year 2012. 
εi: the residual from the model. 
With regard to the variable OPT, when it takes the 
value of 0 for the fiscal year 2012, the preceding four 
years were checked to ensure that the firm did not award 
stock options to its executives. 
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B. Empirical Models 
From the basic model of Ohlson [3], which 
empirically tests the value relevance of accounting 
information, we will proceed in stages. From Equation 1 
to Equation 5, we will gradually include the relevant 
variables in our model. 
 
Price i = a + bEPSi + cBVSi + εi (1) 
 
Equation (1) is the basic model that tests the value 
relevance of the book value (BVS) of a firm in a given 
year. The Ohlson model [3] includes the variable EPS. 
We expect the coefficients b and c to be positive and 
significant. 
 
Price i = a + bEPSi + cBVSi + dSizei + eLevi 
+ fGrowthi + gLossi + εi (2) 
 
Equation (2) includes all the control variables chosen 
according to the literature on value relevance (see [9] and 
[10]). We do not predict the sign of the coefficient d. 
Reference [11] stated that although firm size affects 
prices, the sign of the association tends to vary across 
studies. We do not predict the sign of coefficient e. 
Reference [10] predicts that leverage negatively affects 
prices because high leverage means high risk. However, 
leverage can also improve prices when perceived as a 
governance mechanism ([12]). According to [10], growth 
is positively associated with prices because the stock of a 
firm with growth opportunities is expected to increase in 
the future. Finally, the variable Loss is expected to be 
negatively associated with prices. According to [11], in 
case of losses, prices take lower values. 
 
Price i = a + bEPSi + cBVSi + dBVS*OPT + eSizei 
 + fLevi + gGrowthi + hLossi + εi (3) 
 
Equation (3) tests if the quality of financial reporting 
improved as a result of the awarding of stock options to 
executives. We do not predict the sign of coefficient d. 
Indeed, because of the recent scandals relating to 
executive stock option award, investors may not react 
positively to accounting information. 
Price i = a + bEPSi + cBVSi + dBVS*OPT + 
eBVS*ETH 
+ fSizei + gLevi + hGrowthi + jLossi + εi (4) 
 
Equation (4) tests if the quality of financial reporting 
improved as a result of a high level of perceived business 
ethics. According to the results obtained by [8], we expect 
the coefficient e to be positive and significant. 
 
Price i = a + bEPSi + cBVSi + dBVS*OPT + 
eBVS*ETH 
 + fBVS*OPT*ETH + gSizei + hLevi 
 + jGrowthi + kLossi + εi (5) 
 
Equation (5) constitutes the contribution of the 
present study to the literature: it tests the moderating 
effect of the level of business ethics on the quality of 
financial reporting when firms award executives stock 
options. We expect the coefficient f to be positive and 
significant. 
C. Sample 
The initial sample is made up of Canadian high-tech 
companies taken from the Stock Guide database for the 
fiscal year 2012. This sector was selected because 
companies therein have already been examined in the 
literature on the value relevance of accounting 
information ([13], [14], [15]). Many firms in this sector 
grant executive stock options.  
The initial sample comprised 124 firms. Further 
selection was based on the availability of data for each 
firm in the various data sources. The final sample 
includes 116 Canadian IT firms. 
D. Data sources 
All financial data were obtained from the latest 
available financial statements of the Stock Guide 
database, 2012 version. Fiscal year end ranges from 
March 31, 2012 to December 31, 2012. The variables 
OPT and ETH were collected manually from management 
proxy circulars available in the SEDAR (System for 
Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval) database, 
which is the official site that provides access to most 
public securities documents and information filed by 
public companies and investment funds with the Canadian 
Securities Administrators (CSA). 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table I shows the descriptive statistics related to the 
continuous variables collected from the 116 Canadian IT 
companies in the sample. The mean earnings per share 
(EPS) is negative. 
TABLE I DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CONTINUOUS 
VARIABLES 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
EPS 116 -13.1 4.4 -.130 2.401 
BVS 116 -.239 13.570 2.821 3.651 
Price 116 .005 268.0 11.905 36.772 
Size 116 10.09 23.110 18.026 2.302 
Leverage 116 .070 59.403 1.618 7.752 
Growth 116 .463 999.990 90.210 280.717 
 
In fact, 41% of firms in the sample reported a net 
loss for the 2012 fiscal year (see Table II), which justifies 
the inclusion in our models of the control variable Loss. 
About 72% of the firms in the sample issued executive 
stock options and 46% of the firms had taken concrete 
actions to ensure that their executives comply with their 
code of ethics. 
TABLE II FREQUENCY OF DUMMY VARIABLES 
 Frequency Percentage 
OPT 84 72.4 
ETH 53 45.8 
Loss 48 41.4 
 
If we divide the sample into two subgroups 
according to whether or not options are granted to 
officers, the two subgroups show no significant 
difference with respect to the independent variables that 
test the value relevance of accounting information (see 
Table III). 
Table IV shows that if we divide the sample into 
two subgroups depending on the variable Ethics, we find 
that firms showing a high level of business ethics have a 
larger size and a higher growth opportunity than do firms 
with weak business ethics. 
B. Correlation between Variables 
In this section, the univariate relationships between 
the dependent variable (Price) and the independent 
variables are examined, and a potential multicollinearity 
problem between the independent variables is sought. 
Table V presents the Pearson correlation matrix. The 
matrix shows positive and significant correlations 
between stock prices and earnings per share and between 
stock prices and book value per share. Of the two 
independent variables, book value per share shows the 
strongest relationship with stock prices. This is in line 
with [5], who shows that over time, the importance of 
book value has increased at the expense of earnings. One 
interaction term shows a significant correlation with 
stock prices. BVS*ETH is positively correlated with 
stock prices as expected. 
Regarding the correlation between the independent 
variables, although some correlations are significant, no 
severe multicollinearity problem between the 
independent variables was identified in that the 
correlation coefficients are relatively low (generally 
below 0.7). 
TABLE III MEAN DIFFERENCES – VARIABLE OPT 
 OPT N Mean Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Sign. (2-tailed) 
EPS 1 84 .249 .528 .355 .140 
 0 32 -.279    
BVS 1 84 2.401 -1.154 .785 .134 
 0 32 3.555    
Size 1 84 17.831 -1.509 .486 .298 
 0 32 18.340    
Leverage 1 84 1.990 1.203 1.653 .468 
 0 32 .787    
Growth 1 84 79.635 -48.048 59.753 .423 
 0 32 127.683    
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TABLE IV MEAN DIFFERENCES – VARIABLE ETH 
 
 ETH N Mean Mean Difference Std. Error  Difference Sign. (2-tailed) 
EPS 1 53 -.032 -.252 .317 .430 
 0 63 .220    
BVS 1 53 3.310 1.004 .686 .146 
 0 63 2.306    
Size 1 53 18.465 .893 .428 .039 
 0 63 17.572    
Leverage 1 53 2.758 2.216 1.457 .131 
 0 63 .542    
Growth 1 53 146.15 106.88 52.278 .043 
 0 63 39.271    
 
 
TABLE V PEARSON CORRELATIONS 
 Price EPS BVS BVS*OPT BVS* ETH BVS* OPT* ETH Size Lev Growth Loss 
Price 1          
EPS .288** 1         
BVS .574** .118 1        
BVS*OPT .094 .280** .716** 1       
BVS*ETH .601** .090 .718** .441** 1      
BVS*OPT* 
ETH 
.057 .173 .564** .723** .711** 1     
Size .332** -.073 .688** .489** .606** .467** 1    
Lev -.042 .002 -.118 -.082 -.071 -.045 -.498** 1   
Growth -.066 .026 -.251** -.173 -.164 -.105 -.404** .516** 1  
Loss -.239* -.347** -.382** -.322** -.207* -.161 -.310** .137 -.135 1 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).   * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
C. Regression Analysis 
Table VI shows the results of five different 
regressions between stock prices and several independent 
variables. Equation (1) replicates the basic Ohlson [3] 
model. This model reports a significant and positive 
association between EPS and prices and between BVS 
and prices. These associations are as expected and are 
consistent with Ohlson’s results. 
In equation (2), we added all the control variables to 
the basic model. The associations between EPS and prices 
and between BVS and prices remain positive and 
significant. None of the control variables shows a 
significant association with prices.  
In equation (3), we add the interaction variable 
BVS*OPT. This addition indicates whether executive 
stock option award increases the value relevance of 
accounting numbers. The results show that the 
explanatory power of the model improves. The R2 of the 
regression model increases from .397 (equation 2) to .721 
(equation 3). The positive and significant associations 
between prices and EPS and BVS hold. The association 
between prices and BVS*OPT is highly significant and 
positive. This suggests that the granting of options to 
executives gives investors confidence in the use of 
accounting information in their decision making process. 
It seems that investors ignore the scandals related to 
executive stock options. 
Equation (4) tests the association between business 
ethics and value relevance. We add in this equation the 
interaction BVS*ETH. The positive and significant 
associations between prices and EPS, BVS and 
BVS*OPT hold. The coefficient of BVS*ETH is positive 
as expected but not significant. 
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The full model Equation (5) includes all our 
independent variables. Our latest addition is that of the 
interaction BVS*OPT*ETH. The results are interesting. 
First, the association between price and EPS remains 
positive and significant. However, the association 
between price and BVS is no longer significant and the 
association between price and BVS*OPT becomes 
negative and insignificant. The association between price 
and BVS*ETH is positive and significant as expected. 
Finally, the association between price and 
BVS*OPT*ETH is positive and highly significant as 
expected. It seems that executive stock option award does 
not suffice to improve the quality of financial reporting 
(the coefficient of BVS*OPT is negative and not 
significant). Rather, the fact that investors perceive that 
the level of business ethics in a firm is high ensures that 
the quality of its financial reporting is better when 
executives are awarded stock options. 
 
TABLE VI MULTIPLE REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Price) 
 Predicted value Eq (1) Eq (2) Eq (3) Eq (4) Eq (5) 
Intercept 
(t-value) 
 -3.103 
(-.865) 
-9.022 
(-.233) 
-26.159 
(-.937) 
-14.971 
(-.512) 
-34.035 
(-1.190) 
EPS 
(t-value) 
+ 3.630*** 
(3.184) 
4.053*** 
(3.161) 
9.212*** 
(6.871) 
9.105*** 
(6.798) 
9.626*** 
(7.453) 
BVS 
(t-value) 
+ 5.943*** 
(7.182) 
6.440*** 
(5.023) 
11.684*** 
(10.546) 
10.543*** 
(7.367) 
3.807 
(1.488) 
BVS*OPT 
(t-value) 
?   9.895*** 
(9.809) 
9.264*** 
(8.236) 
-2.493 
(-1.028) 
BVS*ETH 
(t-value) 
+    1.449 
(1.253) 
8.271*** 
(3.373) 
BVS*0PT*ETH 
(t-value) 
+     8.596*** 
(3.117) 
Size 
(t-value) 
?  .048 
(.022) 
1.166 
(.732) 
.577 
(.349) 
1.773 
(1.088) 
Lev 
(t-value) 
?  -.161 
(-.303) 
.010 
(0.028) 
-.041 
(-.109) 
.102 
(.285) 
Growth 
(t-value) 
+  .012 
(.711) 
.009 
(.771) 
.008 
(.663) 
.007 
(.599) 
Loss 
(t-value) 
-  7.397 
(1.054) 
5.676 
(1.144) 
4.426 
(.877) 
4.076 
(.844) 
R2  .389 .397 .721 .725 .752 
F  32.798 10.883 34.648 30.697 30.923 
P Value  < .01 < .01 <.01 < .01 < .01 
N  116 116 116 116 116 
*** Correlation is significant at the .01 level.   ** Correlation is significant at the .05 level 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The objective of the present study was to test the 
improvement of the quality of financial reporting when 
firms award executive stock options. We add in our 
regression model a variable that measures the level of 
business ethics. To our knowledge, no previous study has 
examined the moderating effect of this variable on the 
relevance of accounting information.  
This study found that the presence of executive stock 
options seems to be interpreted positively by investors, 
increasing their confidence in the accounting information 
reported during decision making only when they perceive 
that the level of business ethics in these firms is high. 
Nonetheless, the study has limitations. First, the 
population comprised high-tech companies exclusively. 
Perhaps perceptions of investors in high-technology firms 
differ significantly from those who invest in other sectors, 
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which would limit the scope of the results obtained. Lastly, 
our measure of perceived business ethics level is not perfect. 
Indeed, the level of business ethics is hardly observable. We 
relied on the information contained in management proxy 
circulars to identify concrete actions taken by firms to 
enforce their code of ethics.  
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